"A Mad Dash to Disaster": The First World War
“For decades, historians have been debating who must be responsible for the outbreak of the First World War,” Henry Kissinger, the former U.S. Secretary of State, wrote in Diplomacy, his study of the last three centuries’ efforts to achieve sanity in international relations.
A history-making diplomat as well as a historian, Kissinger concluded that no country can be singled out, because “[e]ach of the major powers contributed a quota of shortsightedness and irresponsibility....”
What Kissinger called “a mad dash to disaster,” World War I (1914-1918) — which claimed 32 million military and civilian casualties, impoverished Europe, destroyed three empires, and set the stage for an even more savage World War II — had many roots. Above all, it resulted from the historic rivalry between France and Germany for the domination of Europe, a contest that in the late 19th century put the two countries on an astonishingly reckless path.
Faced by the fast-growing German empire of Kaiser Wilhelm II, France in 1894 entered into a highly hazardous treaty with the rapidly decaying Russian empire of Czar Nicholas II. Desperate for allies, both countries agreed to mobilize their armies should any member of the so-called Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy do likewise, for any reason whatever. Given the continent’s many tensions and grievances, this hair-trigger arrangement made general war almost a certainty.
And to get ready for it, Chief of the German General Staff, Alfred von Schlieffen, had another doomsday idea. He designed a plan for defeating both France and Russia by attacking France through neutral Belgium and, upon conquering Paris, throwing the weight of his army against Russia.
The plan’s fatal flaw was that Great Britain, which historically preferred to stay out of the continental squabbles, regarded any aggression against Belgium as a threat to its naval power and such as casus belli — the start of a war.
Into this highly combustible atmosphere, on June 28, 1914, a radical Serbian nationalist tossed a burning match by assassinating Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of yet another European superpower, the Austro-Hungarian empire of the Habsburg monarchy. The fateful shots were fired as Ferdinand’s car was turning during his visit to Sarajevo, the capital of Austrian province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and both the Archduke and his wife were killed.
Their tragedy, in Kissinger’s words, quickly escalated into a conflagration “with the inevitability of a Greek tragedy.”
The first to throw a punch was the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, like Russia, was in decline, but still eager to absorb Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina’s neighbor. On July 23, the Vienna government officially blamed the assassination on Serbia, and presented it with ten clearly unacceptable demands — such as firing of certain Serbian army officers — that were purposely designed to provoke a war.
On July 24 and 25, Serbia rejected the demands and decreed general mobilization whereupon Austria-Hungary broke off diplomatic relations with Serbia, and Czar Nicholas II, who regarded himself as Serbia’s protector, ordered partial mobilization of the Russian army.
On July 26, Austria-Hungary also mobilized, and on July 28, it declared war on Serbia.
On July 30, Kaiser Wilhelm II declared a “state of danger of war” and gave Russia an ultimatum to provide an assurance that it will not support Serbia. When the Czar — who was Kaiser Wilhelm’s II cousin — refused to comply, Germany fired off another ultimatum, this time to France, demanding its commitment to remain neutral.
When the Paris government did not respond, Germany on August 1 mobilized, declared war on Russia and began implementing the von Schlieffen’s plan for fighting on two fronts.
On August 2, Germany attacked Luxembourg. On August 3, it declared war on France. And on August 4, it declared war on Belgium, which had refused to let the Kaiser’s troops to cross its borders into France.
That brought into conflict Great Britain, which first warned Berlin that Belgium must be kept “neutral” and, upon receiving an “unsatisfactory reply,” declared war on Germany.
The War and Its Aftermath
What followed was a massacre that lasted an interminable four years, three months, and eventually brought into the maelstrom two million American “doughboys.”
Divided into the Allied Powers (mainly Great Britain, France, and Russia, thought they were later joined Italy and the U.S.) and the Central Powers (primarily Germany, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire), troops from fourteen nations battered one another on three fronts — Western, Eastern and Southern.
The heaviest and eventually decisive fighting was done on the Western front, where French, British and eventually, American soldiers were locked in a remorseless trench warfare with von Schlieffen’s army. Both sides employed every available weapon — including the newly invented tanks and airplanes, as well as poisonous gas-based warfare — to achieve small, back-and-forth advances that had practically no effect on the conflict’s outcome.
What heightened the tragedy of the 20th century’s first Armageddon was that it’s outcome was practically decided by the war’s first battle. The Schlieffen Plan effectively collapsed already on August 22, 1914, when a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men arrived in Belgium and slowed down the German advance on Paris. By September 5, 1914, the French and English defenders topped that success by defeating the Kaiser’s army in a major battle on the River Marne, north of the French capital.
Afterwards, the two sides burrowed into miles of dugouts and trenches during a four year-long stalemate that occasionally exploded into massive battles, one of which — the four-months-long British-French offensive on the River Somme — cost both sides more than a million casualties. But in July, 1918, when the German army made “the last throw of the dice” to reverse the course of the war, it was halted on the River Marne, the same area where it was first defeated in 1914.
There were several reasons for that desperate final offensive. First and foremost, in March 1917, President Woodrow Wilson had responded to the outrageous sinking of four American ships by German submarines by abandoning the U.S. policy of neutrality.
He asked Congress to declare a war on Germany and on April 6, 1917, Congress overwhelmingly agreed. When, by the end of the year, the Yankee soldiers began reinforcing the Allies, German generals knew they had to move fast or the war was lost.
Moreover, on the Eastern and Southern fronts, where there had been relatively little fighting, three of the participating empires — all of them long in decline and saddled with weak and decrepit regimes — were disintegrating. Two of them were allies of Germany. Austria-Hungary fell apart after its troops, mostly Slavs, refused to fight and deserted the army by the tens of thousands. The other loser was the Middle Eastern Ottoman empire, whose fate was sealed when the British defeated its Turkish troops in Palestine.
The third leftover of the antebellum years was the three centuries-old rein of the Russian Romanovs. It was buried by the Bolsheviks who in October, 1918, overthrew Czar Nicholas II and took Russia out of the war. Good news as it was for the Germans, the chaos in Russia was overshadowed by ominous developments on their own home front.
In 1918 Germany, normally a paragon of law and order, was in the throes of a major economic collapse and rising anarchy. In November, the Kaiser abdicated, fled to the Netherlands, and the remaining leaders of the exhausted Central powers signed an armistice with the also exhausted — but victorious — Allies in a railway carriage in France.
Peace and Its Consequences
The final chapter of the World War I was written in 1919 by the Paris Peace Conference. One of the longest and most overdone talk-a-thons of the 20th century, it was attended by representatives of 27 nations who sat on 58 committees and attended 1,646 meetings without ever consulting with the defeated Germany, Austria-Hungary, or Ottoman empire, or fractured Russia, none of which were invited.
At the top of the peace-making pyramid was the Supreme Council of the “Big Four,” who represented the four major victors of the war. This included U.S. President Woodrow Wilson and three European prime ministers: David Lloyd George of Great Britain, Georges Clemenceau of France, and Vittorio Orlando of Italy.
Wilson, who enjoyed enormous prestige with the European Allies, was the towering presence at the conference. He came to Paris not only without demands for any compensation for the fighting done by the American Expeditionary Force — which, among others, defeated the September 1918 German Meuse-Argonne offensive — he presented his three counterparts with an agenda that Kissinger described as showing “a confidence, a power, and an idealism that were unimaginable to [America’s] more jaded European allies.”
The President had announced his program for the Peace Conference — the famous Fourteen Points — before a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918. The most far-reaching proposal was for the creation of an unprecedented League of Nations, defined as a world-wide “association… to maintain the inviolate security of… the seas, prevent any war... [and provide] a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.”
The rest of the points reflected Wilson’s liberal criteria for new global order. He called for democracy, collective security, and self-determination, and included such provisions as open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, general disarmament, and the removal of trade barriers — measures that, as Kissinger put it, “had not undergirded any previous European settlement.” They were also a far cry from the agenda of the other victors.
The only relatively minor claims on the losers were made by Italy, which had entered the war late and was satisfied with annexing the South Tirol part of Austria. Lloyd George, who had promised to “squeeze Germany until the pips squeak” tried to live up to his pledge but also looked for compromises between Wilson’s idealistic concepts and the “Tiger” Clemenceau’s hard-boiled demands for full reparations from Germany.
In the end, Wilson’s most important success was the creation of the League of Nations, which eventually grew to 58 members. Its potential power to maintain peace, however, was drained when the U.S. Senate refused to allow the country to join the organization.
Also contrary to Wilson’s wishes, the Versailles Treaty signed on June 28, 1919, extracted heavy reparations from Germany, which was required to surrender 13 percent of its pre-war territory, give up its colonies and its economically important Upper Silesia, and become militarily impotent.
It was a severe and short-sighted punishment that no major nation would accept for long. A little over a decade after it was signed, the economic hardships blamed on the peace treaty fueled the rise of Germany’s revanchist Nazi party and its demagogic leader, Adolf Hitler, whose uppermost goal was to start a new world war.