The Monroe Doctrine and American Imperialism
When the British poet John Donne wrote in 1624 that “No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent” he defined an inescapable condition that pertains not only to individuals — it shapes the fate of countries. Our Founding Fathers were aware of the hazards and burdens of belonging to the family of nations, and busy as they were creating their own society, they wanted to keep their coexistence with others down to a minimum.
President George Washington said so in September 1796 in his famous Farewell Address. Turning to the subject in his 32-page list of things the nation should and should not do, he cautioned that: “It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” and added that “The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is… to have with them as little political connection as possible.”
A quarter of a century later, minimizing foreign involvement was still the United States policy. John Quincy Adams, the Secretary of State in 1821, declared America to be “the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all,” but rejected the idea that “She… goes abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”
Yet only two years later, Adams authored a seminal document that pointed American foreign policy in the opposite direction. It was a declaration that made the United States the guardian of the independence of all the nations of the North and South American continents — the entire half of the globe called The Western Hemisphere.
The doctrine, presented by President James Monroe in his December 2, 1823 annual message to Congress, declared that the United States would regard any extension of European power “to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety” and asserted that “The American continents… are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.”
In a breathtaking about-face, the proclamation reversed George Washington’s policy of American non-involvement and self-restraint in dealings with foreign nations. Instead, it warned them to restrain themselves in their dealings with the U.S.- protected Western Hemisphere.
The Monroe Doctrine illustrated two truths about our (and every other nation’s) foreign policy. It started by setting forth principles that were meant to be immutable. And over time, it showed how they can be changed in response to changing circumstances — such critical facts as its political stability, the growth of the economy, and its military readiness.
As long as our country was preoccupied with building up these strengths, the Monroe Doctrine and American foreign policy remained largely the same. But as time went on, the relative strengths of America and the foreign powers underwent a profound change.
To begin with, America became the magnet for millions of people who were brave, restless, and hardy enough to hazard the long and dangerous journey to what was seen as the land of endless opportunities. They arrived in staggering numbers. In 1820, the U.S. population was 9.5 million and its average annual increase was 240,000. By 1901, the corresponding totals were 77.6 million and 1.5 million.
The immigrants were capable, and they worked hard. By 1895, the U.S. had surpassed Great Britain in manufacturing output and by 1900, the New World was producing more energy than Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, Russia, Japan, and Italy combined. Between the end of the American Civil War and the turn of the century, U.S. coal production rose by 800 percent, steel rails by 523 percent, and wheat production by 256 percent.
“No nation has ever experienced such an increase in its power without seeking to translate it into global influence,” wrote former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Diplomacy, his history of the U.S. foreign policy. And successive U.S. administrations were no exceptions. They began stretching the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine until it covered practically any action they wanted to take in the Hemisphere.
For example, President James K. Polk tried to justify the 1845 annexation of Texas by arguing that as an independent state it might become “an ally or dependency of some foreign nation,” and thus endanger American security.
In 1861, State Secretary William H. Seward proposed to invade Cuba on similarly specious grounds – he warned that if the South should secede from the Union, some European power might exploit the Union’s weakness to take over the island. (President Lincoln turned down the idea.)
By the end of the century, the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine had been expanded to justify U.S. hegemony throughout the hemisphere and America was ready to flex its muscles still farther. As Secretary Kissinger pointed out, “no one articulated this attitude more [effectively] than Theodore Roosevelt, the president who insisted that it was America’s duty to make its influence felt globally.”
The Roosevelt Corollary
President “Teddy” Roosevelt, the fifth cousin to Franklin D. Roosevelt, the U.S. president during World War II, was a study in contrast. He was the son of a wealthy, patrician family that had lived in New York for 200 years, and as a Harvard-educated adult, he travelled the world to study scientific subjects and authored 17 books. But he was pugnacious, loved strenuous physical exercise, and during the 1898 Spanish-American War won fame for such bravery as leading the charge of his Rough Riders up the San Juan Hill in Cuba.
As the Vice President and successor of President William McKinley, Roosevelt continued to demonstrate both sides of his personality. He negotiated a treaty that ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, and became the first American to win the Nobel Peace Prize. But already years earlier, he was America’s foremost advocate of an aggressive foreign policy that broke the limits of the Monroe Doctrine.
For example, in 1893, Roosevelt — then a Civil Service Commissioner — demanded the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands after their American residents had brazenly overthrown Queen Liliuokalani.
Two years later, he called for a war with Britain because of its dispute with Venezuela over the boundary of the British Guayna.
And In 1901, as the vice president, he supported the so-called Platt Amendment that compelled the Cuban government to let the U.S. to intervene unilaterally in Cuban affairs, and gave Washington a lease on two naval bases.
Sworn-in as the president following the 1901 assassination of McKinley, Roosevelt announced that he wished “to see the United States the dominant power on the shores of the Pacific Ocean"; started a major naval build-up; and urged the construction of a Central American canal that would enable the ships to quickly reach the Pacific. When he was elected president, the U.S. ranked fifth among naval powers. By 1917, it had 20 battle ships and was second only to Great Britain.
Roosevelt’s recent biographer, Nathan Miller, argued in his Theodore Roosevelt, a Life that the president had distorted the Monroe Doctrine because he believed that “America had the moral obligation to overawe international bullies, maintain order, and uplift backward peoples.”
But whatever his intentions, Roosevelt’s major legacy was an addition to the Monroe Doctrine that — rather than protecting the Hemisphere — put the fear of Uncle Sam into South American debtors. What prompted the measure was chaos in the Dominican Republic after it defaulted on its foreign debts, and Italy threatened to interfere in support of the creditors.
The president first declared that “If any South American country misbehaves toward any European country, let the European country spank it,” and said he wanted “to do nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo Domingo.” But on second thought, he instructed on May 20, 1904 his Secretary of War to read at a ceremonial dinner an open letter that spelled out the so-called Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.
It said in part that “If a nation shows that it knows how to act with decency… , if it keeps order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference from the United States.” But, Roosevelt added with his customary bluntness, “brutal wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may finally require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the United States cannot ignore this duty… ”
After an Italian cruiser appeared off the coast of the Dominican Republic, Roosevelt saw to it that the debts were collected by an American.
Two of Roosevelt’s successors tried to rid the Monroe Doctrine of the sting of his “big stick” policy. One of them was Woodrow Wilson, who in January 1917 announced his plan for the League of Nations by proposing “that the nations should… adopt the doctrine of President Monroe... that no nation should extend its polity over other nation or people... that all nations henceforth avoid entangling alliances which would draw them into competitions for power... ”
His proposal was accepted by 58 foreign countries but rejected by the majority of U.S. Senators, some of whom saw it as an example of the entangling alliances abhorred by George Washington. The other president was Franklin D. Roosevelt, who renounced the embarrassing Platt Amendment.
In the 1890s, the United States, once again by unilateral action extended the doctrine to include the right to decide how a dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain over the boundaries of British Guiana should be settled. Secretary of State Richard Olney told the British, “Today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition…. its infinite resources combined with its isolated position render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other powers.” The British, troubled by the rise of Germany and Japan, could only acquiesce in American pretensions. But Latin American nations protested the way in which Washington had chosen to ‘defend’ Venezuelan interests.
Roosevelt’s ‘Big Stick’ Latin American policy became synonymous with the Monroe Doctrine, much to the chagrin of later American policymakers, who sought in various ways to change the image of the Monroe Doctrine. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the cousin of Teddy Roosevelt announced his intention to replace the Big Stick with the Good Neighbor. At his direction, for example, the United States renounced the right to intervene in Cuban affairs under the Platt Amendment. But it did not give up its naval base in Guantanamo Bay.
A variety of treaties signed during and after World War II attempted to turn the Monroe Doctrine into a multilateral undertaking, renamed the Inter-American System. When the United States dealt with the problem of Castro’s Cuba, for example, or intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965, Washington was always careful to declare that it was acting with, and even at the behest of, the Organization of American States.